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Is data a toaster? Gender, sex, sexuality and robots
Anne Cranny-Francis1
ABSTRACT This article considers the development of robotics through the lens of Gender
Studies, with a particular interest in exploring relationships of intimacy involving robots. The
production of sex robots has prompted some ethicists to set up the Campaign Against Sex
Robots, their position articulated in Kathleen Richardson’s, 2015 paper, “The Asymmetrical
‘Relationship’: Parallels Between Prostitution and the Development of Sex Robots”. It is
notable that these sex robots are commonly referred to as sexbots or fembots, but there is
seldom reference to a malebot, though makers suggest that they can or will be made. Others
(notably the makers) see this technology as no different from a vibrator or dildo and suggest
that it could be a way of dealing with aberrant and criminal sexual behaviours including
paedophilia. Intimacy is more than sexual practice, of course, and the ability of humans to
form emotional attachments to technology is well-documented. Consider, for example, Maja
Mataric’s description of the relationships formed by families with their Roomba vacuum
cleaner in the Robotics Primer (2007). This led to problems for the makers for whom it was
less expensive to replace a broken machine than to ﬁx it, but who were faced with demands
from families that their Roomba be repaired and returned to them. This article addresses this
debate, exploring a range of contributions from ethicists, roboticists, gender theorists and
others, and making speciﬁc reference to the television programs, the Scandinavian series,
Real Humans (2012) and its English version, Humans (2015), as well as to Jordan Wolfson’s
recent artwork, Female Figure (2014). This article is published as part of a collection on
gender studies.
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In the Star Trek: The Next Generation episode, ‘The Measure ofa Man’ (1989) a Starﬂeet scientist, Commander Bruce Maddoxhas come aboard the starship Enterprise in order to conduct
an experiment on the positronic brain of android crew member,
Commander Data. When it is revealed that the experiment may
wipe Data’s memory erasing the being he has become, the crew
object to the experiment and Data refuses permission for the
research. When Maddox insists on his right to conduct the
research on the grounds that Data is a machine owned by
Starﬂeet, a legal hearing is convened to determine whether Data
has the right to self-determination. As sitting JAG ofﬁcer Captain
Phillipa Louvois brutally puts it, unless proved otherwise “Data is
a toaster” and can be disassembled at will.
Louvois appoints Captain Picard to defend Data and First
Ofﬁcer, Commander Riker to act as prosecutor. Riker’s (grud-
ging) demonstration of Data’s mechanical nature is based on a
simple action; he turns him off:
Riker: The Commander is a physical representation of a dream
—an idea, conceived of by the mind of a man. Its purpose: to
serve human needs and interests. It’s a collection of neural
nets and heuristic algorithms; its responses dictated by an
elaborate software written by a man, its hardware built by a
man. And now … and now a man will shut it off.
Picard counters this graphic demonstration of Data’s mechan-
istic nature with an argument that addresses not only Data’s
being but also the nature of humanity:
Picard: Now, the decision you reach here today will determine
how we will regard this … creation of our genius. It will reveal
the kind of a people we are, what he is destined to be; it will
reach far beyond this courtroom and this … one android. It
could signiﬁcantly redeﬁne the boundaries of personal liberty
and freedom—expanding them for some… savagely curtailing
them for others. Are you prepared to condemn him and all
who come after him, to servitude and slavery? Your Honor,
Starﬂeet was founded to seek out new life; well, there it sits!—
Waiting.
This kind of ﬁctionalized debate about the status of the robot
or android has been taking place in science ﬁction since the
invention of the Creature by Victor Frankenstein gave birth to the
genre. The robot has been used as a metaphor to question the
treatment of many groups of people, from the displaced industrial
working-class in Frankenstein (Shelley, 1982 [1818]) to the post-
World War II fantasy of the submissive housewife in The Stepford
Wives (1975). Today we are closer than ever before to having to
address the question as a reality not a metaphor, as is dramatized
in the Swedish television series Real Humans (2012), its British
counterpart, Humans (2015- ) and in a number of recent movies
including Robot and Frank (2012) and Ex Machina (2015). As
Picard notes, our answer to the question will determine not only
the future of the android, but also our own future. This is a debate
about the nature of humanity.
The Star Trek story introduces a number of the concerns
addressed in this essay. First, it graphically introduces a scenario
towards which we are now moving where species other than
human are afforded their own right to live on their own terms.
This potentially includes artiﬁcial beings though present-day
robots are far from the sophisticated android represented by
Commander Data. Second, it demonstrates the power of ﬁctional
narratives to enact contemporary social and cultural debates, and
in particular their interrelation of emotion and reason in the
production of embodied knowing. Thirdly, it reinforces the point
that our struggle to incorporate new technologies into our lives is
fundamentally about the future of human nature and human
society.
In this article, I conﬁne the analysis to the study of human–
robot relations and even more speciﬁcally to the development of
social robots. The article was prompted by the founding of the
Campaign Against Sex Robots instigated by anthropologist,
Kathleen Richardson and informatics researcher, Erik Brilling
and by recent concerns expressed about the development of
Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AI) by scientists and engineers including
Martin Rees (2003), Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk and Bill Gates
(Sainato, 2015). Hawking, Musk and Gates are primarily
concerned that we may create AI capable of developing an
intelligence that we do not understand and that may decide that
human beings are irrelevant or pathological. This is the scenario
enacted in the movie The Terminator (1984) and its sequels
where an AI command system, Skynet wages war on the human
race. Skynet may have once seemed as far from contemporary
reality as current robots are from Commander Data; however, the
proposal that military drones be given autonomy to select and
destroy targets shows how close that reality may be (Sharkey,
2011). The prospect of autonomous drones roaming our skies is
probably a more pressing and immediate threat to human
existence than social robots. And if those drones were to achieve
the kind of intelligence feared by Hawking, Musk and Gates,
Skynet may well become active.
The autonomous drone is the kind of threat that Wallach
(2011) classiﬁes among “speciﬁc discernible risks” that can be
addressed through “innovation, regulation and soft governance”
(187). Wallach also identiﬁes two other kinds of risk, “far-
reaching societal impacts arising from the various ways in which
emerging technologies will be combined” (187) and existential
risks which he explains with a quote from Nick Bostrom: “where
an adverse outcome would either annihilate Earth-originating
intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its potential”
(187). Wallach notes that many emerging technologies combine
these three kinds of risk in various ways. At this moment the
emergence of social robots involves mostly existential and societal
risks simply because the robots are not generally available;
however, they soon may be, at least in industrialised countries. To
put this into context I start with a brief account of what
constitutes a social robot and of their current state of production.
Social robots
The term “social robot” is attributed to a report by Billard and
Dautenhahn (1997) and is generally understood to mean a robot
that is designed to interact with humans. Two years later
Dautenhahn and Billard (1999) presented a deﬁnition that goes
beyond human–robot interaction:
Social robots are embodied agents that are part of a
heterogeneous group: a society of robots or humans. They
are able to recognize each other and engage in social
interactions, they possess histories (perceive and interpret
the world in terms of their own experience), and they explicitly
communicate with and learn from each other. (quoted Fong
et al., 2003: 143)
This deﬁnition suggests a high degree of self-awareness and
sociability which is echoed in the vision of MIT researcher,
Cynthia Breazeal in her book Designing Sociable Robots (2002):
For me, a sociable robot is able to communicate and interact
with us, understand and even relate to us, in a personal way. It
should be able to understand us and itself in social terms. We,
in turn, should be able to understand it in the same social
terms—to be able to relate to it and to empathize with it. Such
COMMENT PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2016.72
2 PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | 2:16072 |DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2016.72 |www.palgrave-journals.com/palcomms
a robot must be able to adapt and learn throughout its lifetime,
incorporating shared experiences with other individuals into
its understanding of self, of others, and of the relationships
they share. In short, a sociable robot is socially intelligent in a
humanlike way, and interacting with it is like interacting with
another person. At the pinnacle of achievement, they could
befriend us, as we could them. (1)
Fong et al. (2003) record a series of terms used to capture the
nuances of robot-human interaction: four terms used by Breazeal,
socially evocative, social interface, socially receptive, sociable, and
their own suggestions, socially situated, socially embedded, socially
intelligent. (145) My point here is not to quibble about
terminology but rather to note the amount of slippage and
indeterminacy in both the vision for robot development and our
understanding of what constitutes social interaction and “the
social”. For example, what an engineer terms a social interaction
may not coincide with what a sociologist or cultural researcher
understands by that term, with their differences proving either
disruptive or informative and empowering depending on the
communicative abilities and openness of the participants.
In relation to the current production of social robots the
International Federation of Robotics web site (2016) notes: “In
2014, about 4.7 million service robots for personal and domestic
use were sold, 28% more than in 2013. The value of sales
increased to US$2.2 billion”. For the period 2015–2018 they
predict sales of domestic (primarily ﬂoor and window cleaning,
lawn mowing) robots to number about 25.9 million units; sales of
toy and hobby robots of about 6 million units; about 3 million
units for educational and research purposes. They also note that
sales of robots for elderly and handicap assistance will be about
124,000 and that: “This market is expected to increase
substantially within the next 20 years”. Of the humanoid robots
that are the focus of most ﬁctional explorations of human-robot
relationships they note:
… there have been no signiﬁcant sales of humanoids as
human companions to perform typical everyday tasks in
production, ofﬁce or home environments. Quite a few
Japanese companies (HONDA, Kawada, Toyota and some
others) and also American, Korean and European companies
are in the process of developing these general-purpose robot
assistants beyond the toy and leisure stage. First shipments of
these humanoid robots started in 2004 to international
laboratories and universities as high-end robotics research
and development platforms.
The development of social robots for domestic use is led by
engineers such as Breazeal (2002, 2003a, b), whose social robot
JIBO is now available for pre-order (now expected to be released
in October 2016). JIBO is not a humanoid robot but interacts
with humans verbally and with the kind of movement exhibited
by the Star Wars robot R2D2. That movement, Breazeal explains,
creates an engagement that facilitates the formation of an
emotional relationship between robot and owner.
The development of explicitly humanoid robots or androids is
led by researchers at sites such as Hiroshi Ishiguro’s Intelligent
Robotics Laboratory in Japan and Hanson Robotics in the United
States. Ishiguro (2006) writes explicitly about his development of
androids to explore the human-robot relationship and ultimately
the nature of the human. A report on the Ishiguro and Hanson
laboratories for CNBC by Harriet Taylor (16 March 2016)
entitled, “Could you fall in love with this robot?” begins:
“Humanlike robots may seem creepy, but some roboticists are
betting they are the key to unlocking a future in which humans
and superintelligent computers coexist, work alongside each other
and even develop relationships”. Taylor’s ﬁnal point is intriguing
and takes us toward one of the ideas proposed by Wallach, techno
sapiens—the prosthetically-enhanced human who can directly
interface with machines and so begins to change fundamentally as
a result. This is yet another potential possibility and problem that
might be explored, however this article focuses on the develop-
ment of robots for domestic use. Accordingly, I want to start with
the most basic robot with which some of us already share our
homes—Roomba.
Roomba
One of the greatest surprises for the manufacturers of Roomba
vacuum cleaners was that many owners made an emotional
connection with their machines (Forlizzi and DiSalvo, 2006).
Roboticist Maja Mataric (2007: 286) reports: “Roomba users
already refuse to have their Roombas replaced when they need
repair, insisting on getting the same one back. What happens
when the robot is much more interesting, intelligent, and
engaging than the Roomba”. Furthermore, some owners name
their machines; talk to them; apologize for getting in their way;
take them on holidays; introduce them to others; and give them
time off work (Forlizzi and DiSalvo, 2006). Just as people forge
emotional relationships with ﬁctional characters, they do the
same with machines, and the machines do not need to be bipedal
human-like androids in order for this to happen.
One explanation for this response is that humans extend the
empathy that is a source of social cohesion (Rifkin, 2009; Segal,
2011) to non-humans. Segal explains this social empathy as a
combination of individual empathy (feeling into someone else’s
experience), contextual understanding and social responsibility,
which enables people to understand others “by perceiving or
experiencing their life situations and as a result gain insight into
structural inequalities and disparities” (266–267). People com-
monly extend this empathy to animals and to other things, living
and non-living—from trees to teddy bears—where it operates as a
model for socially responsible interaction. There are negative
responses to this kind of engagement. For example, Sparrow
(2002) writes about the dangers of robot pets, particularly their
use as companions for the elderly, if this is simply a way to avoid
social responsibility and if it is based on delusions about the
“reality” of the pet. However, I would argue with Rifkin and Segal
that our empathetic responses to the non-human are more often a
form of learning and exploration and rarely result in the kind of
self-delusion he fears.
Another explanation for our attachment to Roomba may come
from the study of material culture, which has shown that human
beings have more than a purely functional relationship with the
things they encounter. Things may also embody memory; enable
interrelationships; actualize important events or earlier civiliza-
tions. The encounter engages the human senses as well as the
intellect, enabling embodied learning and cognition that generates
knowledge: “There is a corporate communication between the
body and things, the person and the world, which points to the
perceptual construction of truth as the involuntary disclosure of
meaning through the senses” (Seremetakis, 1994: 6). These
encounters are often analysed by reference to the notion of affect,
which has become a key term for cultural, social and
philosophical studies of human-object relations including human
engagements with technology. As Wilson (2010) notes, a
groundbreaking study for scientiﬁc research in the late twentieth
century was Antonio Damasio’s book, Descartes’ Error (1994),
which argued that cognitive ability is intertwined with emotion
not separate from it. His research fundamentally challenged the
Cartesian notion of the mind as separate from and in control of
the body and provided scientists with validation of the notion of
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embodied being or embodied subjectivity that was also prominent
in humanities and social research in the latter part of the
twentieth century.
Wilson notes that AI researchers have incorporated this
understanding into their design practice, so that it has become
a key element in the design of social robots, where it facilitates not
only the engagement with humans but also the ability to think
and act: “programming affective states into artiﬁcial agents makes
them more resilient, better able to respond in real time, and more
engaged with the vicissitudes of human use.” (loc. 46) And she goes
on to note: “At the end of the twentieth century, the pioneering
computational question was no longer Can machines think? But
Can they feel?” (loc.46) Wilson cites the work of Kathleen
Woodward whose research demonstrates “that relations between
humans and machines are richly conﬁgured bonds of kinship and
intimacy rather than transactions between a sentient subject and an
inert tool.” (loc.63) Woodward (2009) presents a compelling study
of the interrelationship of thinking and feeling, including a chapter
that speciﬁcally addresses relationships with non-human cyborgs.
These studies address not only the future of our relationship with
the non-human but also conﬁrm the fundamental role of
emotional engagement in our thinking and being.
How much more profound is this engagement likely to be
when the technology looks more like us; when it moves like us
and engages us in conversation? How might it involve sex,
gender, sexuality and love? And how might human gendering,
sexuality and love be transformed by our relationships with our
silicon others? In the ﬁnal section of the paper I address some of
the issues raised by the prospect of our engagement with
humanoid social robots.
Humanoid social robots
Some of the most recent criticism of engagement with humanoid
robots has come from the Campaign Against Sex Robots founded
by Richardson and Brilling, and this addresses a speciﬁc concern
—that robots produced speciﬁcally as sex partners will exacerbate
existing sexual abuses and inequities affecting primarily women
and children (Richardson, 2015). Their campaign was prompted
at least in part by David Levy’s book Love and Sex with Robots
(2007), which argues provocatively for the development of
sexbots and predicts human-robot marriage by 2050. On their
web site Richardson and Brilling present a list of objections to the
development of sex robots:
 We believe the development of sex robots further sexually
objectiﬁes women and children.1
 The vision for sex robots is underscored by reference to
prostitute-john exchange which relies on recognizing only the
needs and wants of the buyers of sex, the sellers of sex are not
attributed subjectivity and reduced to a thing (just like the
robot).
 The development of sex robots and the ideas to support their
production show the immense horrors still present in the world
of prostitution which is built on the “perceived” inferiority of
women and children and therefore justiﬁes their use as sex
objects.
 We propose that the development of sex robots will further
reduce human empathy that can only be developed by an
experience of mutual relationship.
 We challenge the view that the development of adult and child
sex robots will have a positive beneﬁt to society, but instead
further reinforce power relations of inequality and violence.
 We take issue with those arguments that propose that sex
robots could help reduce sexual exploitation and violence
towards prostituted persons, pointing to all the evidence that
shows how technology and the sex trade coexist and reinforce
each other creating more demand for human bodies (Campaign
Against Sex Robots web site (2016)).
It may be easy to dismiss these concerns if they are considered
from the viewpoint of immediate, discernible risk identiﬁed by
Wallach simply because the humanoid robots available now are
not accessible to most householders. However, from the view-
point of what Wallach calls societal risks the Campaign raises
some important issues, which accord with some of the concerns
expressed by Sparrow (2002).
The campaign focuses on the sexual deployment of humanoid
robots made to mimic human women and children. Richardson
and Brilling reject the notion that sex robots will provide an outlet
for pedophiles and other sexual abusers, arguing that the
production of replicant children and adults for the purpose of
violent, non-consensual (or coerced) domination will simply
entrench the sexism and misogyny that enables or generates the
degradation of human children and adults. As Richardson (2015)
noted, if that argument was valid, then the massive online
expansion of the pornography industry should have led to a
decrease in sexual violence and exploitation, but evidence shows
the contrary (291). Indeed, it may simply mean that human
women and children become even more valuable commodities to
abusers and commerce in them more valuable to their procurers,
who might accordingly become even more ruthless in their
methods of acquisition and control. Furthermore, Richardson
and Billing question the basis of this claim: will someone who is a
sexual sadist be satisﬁed by physically assaulting a machine even
if that machine is programmed to show pain or fear? After all, a
sexual sadist is doubtless lacking the empathy that enables
engagement with the non-human. And if the robot is pro-
grammed to show fear and pain, is not the construction of such
simulations part of a technology of gender that is based on power,
control and violence? So these robots are part of a gender regime
that enables, even tacitly approves, the abuse of the weakest and
most vulnerable in our society. The recent BBC series, Humans
articulated this concern when one of its sentient robots, employed
in a brothel, ﬁnally reacted against the violence of a particular
user and killed him. This is a turning point in the narrative and
suggests that this enabling of sexual violence via android partners
is already perceived as a danger.
The Campaign also rejects the notion that sex robots will take
work from consensual prostitutes, by noting again that the spread
of internet porn has not decreased male use of prostitutes but
increased it; Richardson quotes an increase between 1990 and
2000 from 5.5% to 8.8% of men who admit to paying for sex
(291). And, as noted above, human prostitutes may even be
valued more highly than robots, so a rejection of their campaign
on the grounds that it disadvantages sex workers is not valid.
Even if we exclude the limit cases—the sexual sadists and
abusers—the Campaign can be seen as raising a major concern:
that we are creating a technology for purposes based on unjust
and abusive modes of human interaction that will perpetuate
those practices. It is worth diverting brieﬂy to consider the
research background of these arguments, which was the study of
robot laboratories in Japan and the United States.
Robot labs
Anthropologist Robertson (2010) undertook an ethnographic
study of Japanese robot laboratories, which have led the global
interest in the development of humanoid service robots. The
major reasons for the huge expansion of robotics in Japan
identiﬁed by Robertson include: the need for elder carers for a
rapidly ageing population; provision of household help so that
Japanese women will have more children; a disinclination to
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admit foreign workers into the country. At the same time,
Robertson notes that social roles for women in Japan are so
restricted and conservative that women are avoiding marriage
resulting in a low national birth rate. She notes, for example, the
implicit sexism in the dismissive response of one leading
roboticist’s response to her suggestion that women in a
subservient service role (lift operators) could be replaced by
robots: “With a bemused look, he dismissed my ‘Western (obei)
idea’, noting that ﬂesh-and-blood women supplied an authentic
aura of human service so crucial to ensuring customer
satisfaction” (Robertson, 2010: 7).
Robertson’s analysis of the Japanese robotics laboratories
identiﬁed a consistent failure or refusal by engineers to examine
assumptions about sex and gender: “their naïve and unreﬂexive
assumptions about humans” differences informed how they
imagined both the bodies and the social performances of their
creations” (5). The robots they produce are gendered in
conventional and conservative ways: “female” robots are slender,
have their mechanical hardware concealed and have high pitched,
childlike voices, while “male” robots are bigger, chunkier, and
show their mechanics (19–21). This is explained not in terms of
technical necessity but simply (and unreﬂexively) as what people
want or expect. The solutions to the social problems of low
marriage and birth rates might be found, Robertson suggests, by
addressing the conservative gendering of Japanese society that
makes heterosexual marriage so unattractive to Japanese women,
rather than by developing a robot industry.
In analysing the gendering of these robots Robertson returns to
de Lauretis’ (1987) concept of the “technology of gender” which
theorized the ways that gender is a technology for the formation
of human subjectivity. Robertson applies this to David Levy’s
justiﬁcation of robot companionship: “I believe that among the
principal reasons will be the certainty that one’s robot friend will
behave in ways that one ﬁnds empathetic, always being loyal and
having a combination of social, emotional and intellectual
skills that far exceeds the characteristics likely to be found in a
human friend” (106). If we use beings constructed in our own
image and relate to them in a purely narcissistic way so that they
simply reﬂect our assumptions back to us, what consequences
can this have for our ability to interact with beings that we
cannot pre-program? Can we possibly develop emotionally and
socially in such circumstances? In terms of gender and sexuality,
how can we learn anything about those who are different from
ourselves, across the wide variations of sex and gender, if our
most intimate partners are likely to be constructed in terms of
conservative stereotypes, are made to order, and can be discarded
at will?
Technologies of gender
Robertson applies Rossini’s (2003) description of biomedical
engineers to roboticists, claiming that they are “imagineers, not
just of bodies, but of cultural conﬁgurations and social
arrangements as well” (28). She adds: “But the act of imagining
per se does not necessarily yield fresh or progressive results” (28).
Both Robertson and Richardson (co-founder of the Campaign
Against Sex Robots) based their analyses of human-robot
relationships on ethnographic studies of robot laboratories,
Robertson in Japan and Richardson in the United States.
Roberston, Richardson and Brilling all consider the social
implications of introducing a technology based on conservative
gender and sexual politics and practices. For Richardson and
Brilling robots that are made in the image of patriarchal
imaginings of masculinity and femininity; that can be abused in
any way by their owners; that can be made in the image of
children for sexual purposes; that invite engagement by acting as
much like human beings as possible; that live and interact with
human beings and so become part of their everyday lives, inviting
emotional interaction; that are totally subjugated to the desires of
their owners—indeed who have owners—are likely to further
entrench gender and sexual injustice and inequality, not because
of the actions of a few violent people but because of the
environment of gender inequality and of sexual violence they
potentially create.
Increasingly we incorporate digital technology into our lives,
through internet use, games, media, industrial robots, household
and carer services. Many of these services already operate as a
technology of gender through the metaphors by which they
operate, the ways in which they constitute user relations, the
situations they represent. However, it may also be that we are
learning new ways of interacting through the use of this
technology, including new ways of being gender and sexually
diverse; that it enables new and more diverse sexualities to be
recognized and acknowledged, and opens up debates and enables
community formations that were not possible in the past. As
Brahnam et al. (2011) contend:
Gender norms, inscribed in the tools we use, deﬁne who we
are as human beings. This is true, no less, for HCI; interface
design deﬁnes who we are as human beings. Beneath the
screen-based metaphors that cloak the interface are unspoken
gendered subtexts that have the power to bind or liberate.
(402)
Given the ever-increasing numbers of robots and other digital
technologies in our lives, the challenge is to ﬁnd ways of
deploying these technologies that are ethical, egalitarian and
equitable—and not the means of propping up sexist and
misogynistic gender regimes. Ultimately this affects us all, not
just the potential users of sex robots.
This challenge requires a transdisciplinary approach, with
engineers and designers in dialogue with anthropologists, cultural
researchers, sociologists, economists, health workers and others to
produce an informed analysis of technology, its assumptions and
ethics, including its gendering of robots and of human-robot
relationships. A range of perspectives from different disciplines
on human-robot interactions have recently been published:
Connection Science (2006), 18(4) Special Issue on Android
Science; Studies in Ethics, Law and Technology (2008), 2(1)
Special Issue on Robotics; Interaction Studies (2010), 11(2)
Special Issue on Robot Nannies; Interacting with Computers
(2011), 23(5) Special Issue on Feminism and HCI: New
Perspectives; Feminist Theory (2011), 12(2) Special Issue on
Nonhuman Feminisms; Ethics and Information Technology
(2013), 15(2) Special Issue on Armed Military Robots; Journal
of Evolution and Technology (2014), 24(3) Special Issue on
Nonhuman Personhood.
Studying robots is a way of studying ourselves and what it is to
be human: the production of robots and the attempt to make
them more lifelike could be the source and site of transforma-
tional studies of genders, sexualities and the processes of
gendering. It will almost inevitably change who we are as human
beings as we learn new ways of understanding and being in the
world; our challenge is to make this a positive, ethical experience
that changes us and our world in positive ways.
Returning to the Star Trek story with which I started: one
factor cited by Picard as proof of Data’s sentience was his
complex emotional and sexual relationship with ship’s security
ofﬁcer, Natasha Yar. The boundaries breached by their relation-
ship were not android, but human; their relationship was a way of
exploring and expanding the possibilities of not only android but
also human being. Our interactions with robots may be leading us
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in a similar direction but this is not a relationship that should be
left to military research and market exploitation; it involves us all.
As for Commander Data and the humans among whom he lives,
it could result in either enlightenment or enslavement; we must
take up this challenge.
Notes
1 Note that manufacturers have acknowledged that male sex robots can be made, but
they are not the primary market interest.
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